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Just 291 Days Left: Wes Clark and the Third Way
By Mark Grueter
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Former Intelligence analyst and Iraq expert Kenneth M. Pollack, author of 2002’s highly influential The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq, has just published a piece in The Atlantic Monthly (“Spies, Lies, and Weapons: What Went Wrong”) offering a candid review of our failure to find Weapons of Mass Destruction in Iraq. Pollack argues that honest and serious people within the intelligence community did believe Saddam Hussein was hiding significant amounts of WMD. “The U.S. intelligence community’s belief that Saddam was aggressively pursuing WMD pre-dated Bush’s inauguration, and therefore cannot be attributed to political pressure.” Even France and Russia, Pollack reminds us, believed that Iraq had WMD (Why did everyone believe this and how could we have been so wrong? Refer to the complex series of events, beginning in the late 80’s, detailed and speculated upon in Pollack’s piece).
So it is not entirely fair to blame the Bush administration for acting on intelligence that almost everyone assumed was legitimate. But this by no means takes the Bush team off the hook, notes Pollack. “The Administration gave greatest credence to accounts that presented the most lurid picture of Iraqi activities.” In fact, they set up their own group called the Office of Special Plans to work in the Pentagon and essentially grill commissioned intelligence officers about all the evidence. Here’s one of the sillier, though perhaps more dangerous, examples: “Requests were constantly made for detailed analyses of newspaper articles that conformed to the views of Administration officials - pieces by conservative newspaper columnists such as Jim Hoagland, William Safire, George F. Will.” Pollack notes that the OSP and war advocates both in and around the White House were not really lying; they did not manufacture their own intelligence. It’s just that they eagerly disseminated un-vetted intelligence reports to Cabinet officials and the American public - a highly unusual and certainly reckless practice. “They discussed only those elements of intelligence estimates that served their cause.” This should not inspire confidence even amongst the cheerleaders.
Here’s one example of this detrimental procedure in action. In the fall of 2002, many Administration officials, including the President, popped up in the media to claim that Saddam Hussein “would be able to build a nuclear weapon within a year should his regime acquire fissile material (emphasis added).” Deliberately left out of such proclamations was the steadfast believe within the intelligence community that Iraq would not be able to obtain the weapons grade material it would need in order to construct a nuke. Saddam Hussein had been vigorously trying to obtain this material for 25 years, with no success. The probability of him ever obtaining these materials was very low. The Bush Administration consciously neglected to tell the whole story in order to gain support for an invasion, and that’s the problem. And as intelligence had severely overestimated Iraq’s biological and chemical weapons capabilities, it seems all the more unlikely that they were underestimating Iraq’s nuclear potential.
Some of us supported the war for reasons that had little or nothing to do with WMD. And I still believe Iraq and the region are likely better off because of the war. But one must consider how this war, and the questionable fashion in which it was carried out, will impact the long-term interests of a global, enlightened society that at least pretends to value democracy and transparency. Is it ever possible to justify a military invasion when the case for the invasion is built, to some extent, on deception? Maybe. But if you combine the highly plausible argument that the case for war was made on a false pretext with other equally plausible condemnations (i.e. no intelligible post-war strategy, inadequate logistical support for the troops, no demonstrated commitment to the short or long-term interests of the Iraqi people, etc.) well, then, one must begin to wonder.
These are all tough, complicated questions and they will certainly affect the upcoming presidential election. Bush will retain the tacit support of many swing-voting Americans who are unsure of Bush’s strategy for combating terrorism but are even more uncertain of the outsider Dean's plan for a radically different, softer, and more isolationist approach. Since entering the race in late September 2003, General Wesley Clark has offered Americans a third way, and he has been criticized for his seemingly conflicting views on Iraq. Essentially, Clark was opposed to the invasion of Iraq because he thought it diverted much needed resources from Afghanistan and the war on terrorism and because he was losing faith in the Bush Administration to act responsibly. Clark’s initial, yet tentative, support for the Bush team is well documented and is often used against him by Deanites - but this, taken together with his impressive resume, is all the more reason to trust him over a Democrat who will reflexively oppose a Republican Administration on everything no matter what. Clark is well connected to our intelligence community, and he first grew suspicious of the Bush people after hearing about how plans to invade Iraq began immediately after 9/11. Then came the “cherry picking” of Intelligence reports on Iraq. And then, after watching how they were refusing to work with the international community, Clark had had enough.
Clark’s position on Iraq cannot be explained in simple, sound-bite friendly terms, which often makes for bad politics. Howard Dean was able to energize the Democratic base because he came out from the beginning like a junkyard dog against everything Bush was doing. So, because Clark said that had he been a member of Congress he might have considered voting for the resolution in the fall of 2002 (that gave the President authority to act in Iraq if Saddam did not comply with UN disarmament procedures), he’s obviously a hypocrite. For some liberals, anyone who was not categorically against pressuring Iraq is deemed “Republican-ite” and unworthy of support.
The problem with Dean is that he has no leverage to debate Bush on anything to do with national security and foreign policy. Every legitimate argument that Dean can muster about “misleading” the American people, or some of the other complaints listed above, can all be trumped by citing (a) Dean’s utter lack of experience and sophistication on matters as such, and (b) the eminently reasonable, though perhaps unfair, assertion that if Dean had been President, Saddam would still be in power.
Clark, on the other hand, splits the difference between the right-wing ideologues currently in power and the populist ideologues that have feebly arisen to challenge him. It’s a war of the inflexibles: The New York Post versus The Nation. In this time of crisis, Clark is providing a moderate voice of stature; his formidable experience has taught him that national security matters are not black and white issues - they require an appreciation of subtleties. Clark can say to the GOP ‘look, I supported you guys and I was open to the idea of invading Iraq, but you did not persuasively demonstrate how fighting a war in Iraq would help our cause in Afghanistan. Why not root out Al-Qaeda - those responsible for 9/11 - and find Osama bin Laden before moving into Iraq?’ More importantly, he, unlike Dean, can authoritatively lecture Bush for not leveling with the American people. He was a first hand witness to Bush’s meddling in the Pentagon. Clark, unlike Dean, has credibility and support within the intelligence community and military establishment.
History tells us that Clark has fine instincts. As Supreme Commander of NATO forces in the late 90’s Clark argued that an invasion of Serbia in order to overthrow Slobodan Milosevic and stop the ongoing slaughter of Kosovars would be successful without much bloodshed. The idea was vehemently opposed by the Joint Chiefs and one of the more inept Defense Secretaries of recent memory, William Cohen. Those within the Clinton Administration who favored the war, namely Clark, Richard Holbrooke, and Madeline Albright, ended up being proven correct - the war was a success by everyone’s (well, except for Noam Chomsky and Pat Buchanan of course) standards. And after the war, Bill Cohen cheaply and covertly fired Clark for being right, while passing the development off to Clinton and the media as a normal and honorable discharge from military service before Clark could do anything about it.
Let me try to address the two most common reservations many serious people have about General Clark. A few months ago, Clark came under fire for saying that the war in Kosovo was “probably, technically illegal” because it was not sanctioned by the UN - China and Russia threatened a veto so Clinton didn’t bother putting it up for a vote in the Security Council. Instead, the case was made through NATO in order to give the attack legitimacy and a genuine multilateral dimension. Even if Clark is onto something, he “probably” should not have made that remark while running for President because he’s not a lawyer and it makes us wonder why he would prosecute something he considered “illegal.” But Clark, like most of us, understands that what is ‘legal’ and what is ‘right’ are not always the same thing. Morally and intellectually, what matters is that Clark did the right thing and was honest about the intentions of the intervention. There was no attempt to deceive, so unlike in Iraq, the means could be justified more easily to serve the ends. While an invasion may or may not violate international law, Clark and the NATO countries were confident that it was the only moral option. I appreciate Clark’s honesty.
General Hugh Shelton, chairman of the Joint Chiefs during the Kosovo raid, recently said that Clark’s firing “had to with integrity and character issues.” However, since making this statement several months ago, Shelton has refused to explain the meaning behind it. How could any man of integrity and character make such an allegation against another man without ever bothering to back it up? Clark attributes Shelton’s unwillingness to elaborate to embarrassment over having made a statement that everybody involved knows to be untrue - Clark was fired over a policy disagreement and that’s it. If Shelton has other information, why wouldn’t he come forward, now that Clark is running for public office? Perhaps he’s shrewdly waiting to drop some bombshell after Clark wins the nomination? Though, somehow, I doubt it.
This is my last column before the voting begins, so let me make some predictions (always a perilous business). Dean will take Iowa on January 19th, though the race will be interesting with the top four (Dean, Kerry, Gephardt, Edwards) bunched fairly close together. Gephardt will drop out of the race because he won’t have the money to continue. Dean will get a bounce from Iowa to edge out Clark in New Hampshire on January 27th. But Clark’s close second-place finish will surprise and surpass expectations, allowing him to stay in the race. Kerry’s disappointing third place finish in New Hampshire might compel him to drop out. It will become clearer and clearer that Clark is the only candidate, because of an existing, formidable organization and war chest who can compete with Dean nationally. After February 3rd, where several states vote including South Carolina and Arizona, the process will become a two-man race between Clark and Dean. Because the air of inevitability surrounding the Dean campaign will be significantly deflated on this day, Clark has a real chance to win the nomination and, I predict, he will do just that.
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Mark Grueter is pursuing a Masters in Liberal Studies at the Graduate Faculty for Political and Social Sciences. He is the Publications Manager and Web Editor for The Canon, the school's student publication and is a contributor to Stop Smiling, a magazine based in Chicago. He lives in Brooklyn, New York. Grueter may be contacted at [email protected].
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2003 Me Three